I. INTRODUCTION "America needs strong unions balanced by strong employers, each able, if necessary, to resist the unjust demands of the other."' If one agrees with this dictum attributed to Justice Brandeis, one probably would think that it also applies to Germany. A predominant feature of the structure of German labor and employment law is that it has no single format established by the government. The content of German labor and employment law, as well as working conditions, are determined not only by legislators, but also, to a large extent, by trade unions and employer organizations. As parties involved in negotiating and completing collective agreements, trade unions and employer organizations are bound by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany's written constitution) to lay down comprehensive terms and conditions of employment and to adjust these terms and conditions continually to suit prevailing economic and social developments. German trade unions and employer organizations work independent from governmental influences, but still operate within the framework of the constitution and current legislation.
The terms and conditions of employment set forth in collective agreements apply only to employers and employees who are members of the organizations concluding the agreements. 2 However, in practice, collective agreements are also largely extended to cover all other employment contracts.' Thus, unions and employer associations are important and * Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, University of Cologne, Institute for Labor and Commercial Law; Dr. jur. (S.J.D.), 1995, University of Cologne; LL.M., 1998, Harvard Law School. The author wants to thank Professor David Westfall for his kindness in reading the first draft of the manuscript and for many helpful comments and valuable contributions concerning parallels in American labor law. I am also indebted to Dirk Rupietta, a colleague at the University of Cologne, for several helpful suggestions and assistance in looking for some articles which were not available at the Harvard Law School Library.
1. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN 'S LIFE 149 (1946 3. According to German law, every employee has an employment contract. This contract may be in oral, or as in most cases, in written form. As a rule, presumably more than 90% of the time, the employment contract refers to a collective agreement. Where an oral contract is concluded, the employee whose contract is not limited to one month and powerful organizations in Germany.
Due to its nationally-centralized format and high degree of organization, as compared to the United States, 4 the German workforce exhibits an impressive number of union members. In fact, the largest union in the world is the Industriegewerkschaft Metall (the German metal workers union), which has more than three million members. Collective agreements with this union determine the working conditions for an entire branch of German industry. Those involved in reaching collective agreements are primarily responsible for creating a uniform standard of terms and conditions of employment, and they, therefore, assume a particular responsibility extending beyond union relations.
The preceding summary of German labor law indicates the importance of the law of collective bargaining in Germany and the role of the law of industrial action. Although the German Constitution mentions only the right to form associations by employees or employers, the courts have recognized that such a right would be a mere formality unless the activities of these associations were also protected, at least minimally, by law. The right to join an association which is forbidden to pursue its ends is useless, as is constitutional protection of such a mere formal right. Therefore, in 1954, the Federal Constitutional Court held that article 9, section 3 of the Basic Law also protects a minimum level of union activity and ruled that employers' associations cannot be restricted by legislation without amending the Constitution." This minimum area of activity was called Kernbereich (core area).
The Kernbereich included the right to conclude collective agreements, to strike, and to lock out. 8 In some of the decisions that followed, the Court held that every restriction of the Kernbereich of union activity was unconstitutional. However, the Kernbereich was still construed rather narrowly and was seen to comprise only the fundamental structures of the law of industrial action and collective agreement.' Numerous court decisions have stated that the activity of the unions is protected by the constitution only to the extent that must be considered as imperative for the preservation and safeguarding of the association." In other decisions -and sometimes even in different parts of the same decision -the Court seemed to have a different understanding of the Kernbereich. A restriction on protected union activities was held unconstitutional if that restriction was not justified by the legitimate intentions of the legislation, especially if it was not appropriate, necessary, and proportional to protect other constitutional rights. Using these formulations, the Court seemed to have a broad understanding of the Kernbereich, not as the absolute (and thus very limited) restriction on distinct kinds of state action, but as a general requirement that any restriction of 6. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 9(3). 
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union activities needs to be justified to be constitutional. " For almost forty years, the courts followed and affirmed the concept of Kernbereich, thereby establishing it as a solid foundation of German labor law.
Nevertheless, many uncertainties continued as a result of these two approaches to Kernbereich, largely due to the fact that they were very difficult to reconcile. In regard to these uncertainties, the Court's view changed in a decision in January of 1995.12 The decision concerned the constitutionality of a statute regulating (and in fact hindering) collective agreements on ships run by German enterprises but sailing under foreign flags. Here, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to use the term Kernbereich and found instead that the ability to establish collective agreements is part of the protected freedom to act as a union and that this freedom was unconstitutionally restrained by some of the statute's provisions. "
Similarly, in a July 1995 decision, the Court continued to distance itself from the former approach.' 4 A union alleged the unconstitutionality of a statute regulating the provision of unemployment insurance to employees that, while not themselves on strike, nevertheless could not work due to a particular strike's effect on the production process. Once again the Court avoided the term Kernbereich, stating instead that the restraint on the rights conferred by article 9, section 3 of the Basic Law was justified by the legislative aim of protecting other constitutional rights; however, an explicit rejection of the Kernbereich approach as the exclusive means of protection was still absent." 5 The rejection of the exclusivity of Kernbereich finally came with a decision in November of 1995.16 The case concerned the question of whether a union member had the right to distribute flyers and other with a comment by Gregor Thtising).
[Vol. 9:1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN LABOR LAw informational materials during worktime in a plant or whether the employer had the right to forbid this distribution, as he in fact did. The Federal Constitutional Court stated explicitly that not only is Kernbereich protected by the constitutional right of article 9, section 3, but that all other conduct that serves the purpose of achieveing the goals of the union, including the safeguarding and improvement of working and economic conditions, was also protected.
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Based upon the Federal Constitutional Court's decision, a statute is unconstitutional when it limits this conduct, unless the statute is appropriate, necessary, and proportional to protect other constitutional rights. This concept is similar to the previously-described second approach taken by the Federal Constitutional Court in attempting to define the Kernbereich. Nevertheless, it is an important difference now that all union conduct is explicitly protected. This analysis conforms to the general understanding of constitutional rights, namely, that one must first determine whether a certain type of conduct is constitutionally protected and, second, whether its limitation is justified. Depending on the particular constitutional right, such justifications may be derived from other constitutional rights or from general notions of public welfare. 8 However, the Court left open the question of whether the legislature can limit the right granted by article 9, section 3 for other, non-constitutional reasons of general welfare.
In a decision in April of 1996, 9 this new approach was affirmed. The Court had to decide whether the state is allowed to enact a statute replacing the terms of a collective agreement, even if the statutory provisions give employees fewer rights than they previously enjoyed under the collective agreement. More specifically, the issue was whether a statute could limit, after a distinct period of time, the extension of temporary employment to university employees working on their doctoral theses or habilitations, where the collective agreements in force at the time allowed such extensions.' The Court held that the creation of a collective agreement is part of the protected freedom of union activities; therefore, a statute that regulates areas that could also be regulated by collective agreements must be justified. 2 The more a distinct area is regulated by collective agreements, the more onerous the 
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burden of establishing a justification for its infringement. The burden is certainly present when the statute seeks to preclude the union from enacting certain kinds of collective agreements in the future. Furthermore, the burden is especially onerous if the statute is enacted to replace a collective agreement already in existence. The rationale supporting the infringement of a collective agreement follows from the belief that the legislators have a legitimate goal in protecting the freedom of employment of the younger academics.' In essence, the Court found that the younger students should be given the opportunity to secure one of the limited employment positions at the university during their work on dissertations or habilitations. Moreover, the Court held that the objective of safeguarding the functionality of the university in teaching science to the next generation, which the Court considered to form a part of the freedom of science and research, was also a compelling justification for this statute.' These interests were held to prevail over the limitation of the union's right. However, the Court again left open the question whether legislation can limit the right granted by article 9, section 3 to not only protect other constitutional rights, but also to protect common aspects of general welfare.
Ill. RECENT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION
Three recent decisions in the field of industrial action are presented in this section. The first decision concerns whether an employer has the right to close a plant during a strike even though some employees want to continue working and to maintain a claim to be paid for any work completed. The second decision concerns whether a union can strike against an employer who is a member of an employer association, not to achieve a collective agreement with the association as a whole, but to enter into a collective agreement with the employer. The final case concerns whether it is permissible for an employer, at the conclusion of a strike, to lock out only those employees who participated in the strike.
The Right of an Employer to Close a Plant During a Strike
When employees take part in a strike, they lose pay for the time not worked, including the time they are locked out. In such a situation, the employment contract continues, but the legal strike and lockout suspend the [Vol. 9:1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN LABOR LAW employment contract for those who take part in the strike or who are locked out. In addition, employees who do not take part in a strike and who are not locked out lose their right to remuneration if, as a result of industrial action, it has become impossible for them to work or because their continued employment is no longer economically prudent. The latter scenario might arise with respect to employers indirectly affected by an industrial action. An example of this occurs when an automobile factory cannot produce because a supplier, against whom a union has struck, cannot deliver parts. An example of an employer directly affected by an industrial action occurs when only part of the employees are on strike, but the entire production process ceases. 24 The rationale for lost remuneration is explained with what has been called the "sphere-theory." The sphere-theory provides that, because the employees gain the advantages of the strike, they should also bear the disadvantages.' Additionally, German courts have more recently justified their position on the rationale that payment of remuneration in these types of cases endangers the parity of bargaining power between the parties embroiled in an industrial conflict. 26 Thus, for more than seventy years, the prevailing view has been that employees could lose their right to remuneration only because of (1) taking part in a strike, (2) being locked out, or (3) due to employment becoming impossible because of an industrial action. 27 The German Federal Labor Court later affirmed this doctrine explicitly in a case decided in December of 1994.28 However, three months later, the Court explicitly overruled the December 1994 decision and created a new doctrine where the employer's duty to pay remuneration to employees who do not participate in a strike can be suspended. 29 The Court decided that in the case of a strike, an employer against whom the union strikes can close the entire plant even though only a minority of the employees in the plant take part in the strike. A lockout of the remaining employees is not necessary in order to suspend the employment contract for all employees. This is an important shift in the balance of power between the union and the employer because the right to lock out is limited in German law by the principle of appropriateness of means, 30 and it is sometimes difficult to prove that it would not have been possible to employ parts of the workforce in the face of the strike.
The American reader may recognize parallels here to Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., where the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) stated that an employer may take "reasonable measures, including closing down his plant, where such measures are, under the circumstances, necessary for the avoidance of economic loss or business disruption attendant upon a strike."'" It is precisely this restriction which the German Federal Labor Court no longer requires. The decision has been heavily criticized by German labor writers. These writers are of the opinion that if employers do not want to pay their employees, employers should use the lockout to suspend the duties of the employment contract even though the employees want to work and it would be possible to employ them. 32 Despite this criticism, the Court has affirmed its holding in several decisions, and there is no indication the Court will return to the former doctrine. 33
Striking for a Single-Employer Collective Agreement against an Employer who is a Member of an Employer Association
According to article 2 of the German Act of Collective Agreements, 34 unions may arrange collective agreements either with a single employer or with an employer association. In contrast to America where less than fifty percent of employees are covered by multi-employer agreements, most German employers are members of an employer association. The majority of collective agreements are arranged between employer associations and the unions. The employer associations can conclude collective agreements that impact all of their members, a part of their members, or a single member. Usually an agreement covers all members of an industry in a certain region, [Vol. 9:1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN LABOR LAW or for some industries, an agreement can cover the entire territory of the Federal Republic. 35 It is clear that an employer is still able to execute a separate collective agreement when he has joined an employer association, 3 6 and it is also clear that a union can strike for a collective agreement with an employer association that concerns only one member of the association. 3 7 The doubtful case occurs when a union strikes against an employer who is a member of an employer association, not to achieve a collective agreement with the association, but to achieve a collective agreement with the employer.
See Weiss, Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Germany
Last year the Labor Court of Appeals of Cologne found that a strike in the above-described "doubtful case" is illegal if a union is bound by a peace obligation of a collective agreement when the peace obligation also covers the employer against whom the union strikes. 3 " The court referred to the prevailing view that the peace obligation of a collective agreement covering several or all members of the employer association protects all employers who are bound by that agreement. 3 9 Furthermore, a collective agreement protects employers against a strike based upon a separate agreement with the employer that is intended to replace the multi-employer agreement in the plant. The separate agreement need not be mentioned in the collective agreement, because the peace obligation generally does not need to be explicitly mentioned, but rather is assumed to be a necessary part of every collective agreement. The reason for this common view is that, otherwise, the settlement that has led to the conclusion of the collective agreement would afterwards be called into question. ' But what is the law if no collective agreement exists or if the union strikes against a single employer to achieve a collective agreement that concerns areas that are not regulated by the collective agreement with the employer association? It is an established view that a union can lawfully 5th ed. 1977) . The 6th edition will be published in the Spring of 1999. strike against the employer association; however, the question of whether the union can strike against the single employer is uncertain, as the German Federal Labor Court has not decided this issue.
Additionally, the Labor Court of Appeals has held that where a union is not bound by a collective agreement with the employer association, it is free to strike against a single employer. 4 ' "The achievement of a collective agreement with a single employer through industrial action is not unlawful just because the employer is a member of an employer association." 42 Though many German lawyers are of the opposite opinion, 43 the court held that the undoubted capability of the employer to conclude a collective agreement has as its consequence that a union must be allowed to carry a strike through to its conclusion; the capability to execute collective agreements includes the capability to be the target of a strike or lockout. Although there is disagreement within the legal community as to the wisdom of the court's decision, the decision is, for present purposes, final. As the employer only sued for temporary relief, the Labor Court of Appeals was the last venue, and thus, the decision cannot be appealed to the Federal Labor Court.
Locking Out Only the Employees Who Took Part in a Strike
The last decision in the area of industrial action to be discussed is also one decided by the Labor Court of Appeals. The Labor Court of Appeals of Dusseldorf held that an employer is allowed to limit a lockout to those employees who took part in a strike on the previous day." The court further held that this limitation did not violate the freedom of association of the locked-out employees because the lockout did not distinguish between union members and non-organized employees. The lockout only distinguished employees who took part in the strike from employees who did not. 45 Thus, the employer did not discriminate because of membership in a union, and therefore, the lockout was lawful. 
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It is very doubtful, however, whether the Labor Court of Appeal's decision is sound. As noted above, the ability to take part in a strike is an element of freedom of association; thus, to distinguish between strikers and non-strikers is precisely to distinguish between those employees who exercise their right granted by article 9, section 3 of the Basic Law, and those employees who do not. The contrary view to that taken by the court might be more persuasive because agreements "restricting or intended to hamper the exercise of this right shall be null and void; measures to this end shall be illegal." 46 Nevertheless, a report of recent developments in the law of industrial action should mention this decision in view of the uncertainty and discussion in American law concerning "partial lockout;"' the decision of the Supreme Court in American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB 48 does not make the distinction between these two kinds of partial lockouts.
IV. RECENT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
To understand recent developments in the law of collective bargaining, it is helpful to consider that over the last few years union membership in Germany has continuously declined. Furthermore, increasing numbers of employers have discontinued membership in employer associations. One reason for this movement on the employee's side may be the continuous process of individualization in modern industrial society. Other mediating bodies and institutions have also declined in importance (e.g., churches and political parties), and one can see this phenomenon not only in Germany but also in other European countries. 49 However, at least on the employer's side, there is another important reason for the movement.
As stated above, most collective agreements cover a specific region of an industry, or even the entire territory of the Federal Republic for certain industries. Thus, the assigned conditions cannot take account of particular circumstances within individual companies. At the moment, there is extensive discussion in Germany as to how to create a more flexible system of collective agreements, and whether it should be possible for an employer covered by a collective agreement to alter the conditions concerning his plant 46. GG art. 9(3). 
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by agreements with the Works Council. 50 Last year, the Labor and Employment Law of the Deutscher Juristentag section, a biennial meeting of German lawyers that makes proposals for amending the law, discussed this phenomenon and ways to react to it. It decided inter alia:
A change in the relationship between the parties of collective agreements and the Works Council concerning the competence to regulate is not recommended; rather the parties of the collective agreements should use their competence to regulate. in such a manner that different situations in different establishments can be better taken into account. 5 ' Despite this declared belief in the associations and the law of collective bargaining, courts must, on a daily basis, solve the juridical problems that derive from the movement away from collective agreements. A discussion of two of these decisions follows.
Membership in an Employer Association Without Being Bound by Collective Agreements
Under American law, mere membership in an employer association does not necessarily mean that the association can conclude collective agreements covering a particular employer's plant. The association member must affirmatively manifest an intention to be represented by the association in a multi-employer group during collective bargaining in order to be bound by that bargaining unit. 52 Things are different in Germany. Article 3, section 1 of the Collective Agreements Act reads: "Members of the parties to a collective agreement and the employer who is himself a party thereto shall be bound by the collective agreement. " 53 Thus, under German law, unless the collective agreement limits the plants it covers, every employer who is a member of the organization entering the agreement is bound by it, and authorization of the employer associations is not necessary. 55 If the "members of the parties to a collective agreement.. • shall be bound by the collective agreement," then there cannot be such a -thing as unbound membership. 6 Legal scholars further argue that the advantages of membership should also carry the disadvantages. Finally, jurists refer to the principle of the equality of bargaining power. An undesirable shift in power to the employer could threaten the functionality of the system of collective bargaining if, in the case of an industrial action, the employer association was supported by all of its members; in contrast, the union could strike successfully only in plants covered by the collective agreement. As in other plants, it would be very difficult to mobilize employees for a strike from which they would not benefit. Thus, the allowance of memberships without being bound -which never before existed in the history of German collective bargaining -weakens the unions' ability to strike in a manner that the Collective Agreement Act does not contemplate.
Many other commentators disagree with this point of view and consider the Mitgliedschaft ohne Tarifbindung permissible. 5 7 They argue that article 54. Probably the most important advantage is that the association provides legal counsel at no cost and may hold a briefing for the benefit of employers as well as the unions, Manfred Weiss presumes that this "for many employees is the main reason to join a trade union. Hence the trade union somehow is functioning as a sort of insurance in case of disputes. 3, section 1 of the Collective Agreement Act merely limits the most extreme binding effects of a collective agreement. They contend that only members of the parties to a collective agreement shall be bound by the collective agreement. 5 " The reason for this limitation is that by joining the union or employer association, the members -and only the members -have authorized the parties to enter an agreement that binds them. Consequently, it is clear that the parties may enter a collective agreement only for a portion of their members, namely those in a distinct part of an industrial branch or in a distinct region. Thus, limiting the area of application of a collective agreement by a new kind of membership in an association should be allowed; according to the terminology and the policy of article 3, section 1 of the Collective Agreement Act, there is no difference between Mitgliedschaft ohne Tariflindung and being a party to a collective agreement.
The Labor Court of Appeals of Baden-Wiirttemberg was the first appellate court to decide whether a difference exists between Mitgliedschaft ohne Tarijbindung and being a party to a collective agreement. 59 A union member sued his employer for the remuneration granted by the collective agreement. The employer had chosen this new kind of membership. The court considered the Mitgliedschaft ohne Tarifbindung to be effective, explaining its decision mainly on the basis of the goal of article 3, section 1 of the Collective Agreement Act. Thus, the employer was held not to be bound by the collective agreement, and the suit was dismissed.' On October 10, 1996, the Federal Labor Court reversed this decision because of a procedural error and remitted the case to the court of first instance. 6 ' Thus, the case must again proceed through the judicial channels leading back to the Federal Labor Court, and a decision is not expected before the end of 1998. Until then, the question remains open.
The Relationship Between Collective Agreements and Agreements with the Works Council
Perhaps the most famous case in the recent development of the law of collective bargaining is the Viessmann case. 62 The Viessmann company produces heating systems and was a member of an employer association.
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